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Transparent Review of Agency Immigration Decisions
The administrative state has played an increasingly dominant role
in implementing immigration law in the United States. While Congress
and the President have historically been granted plenary power that
limits constitutional judicial review, those same limitations have been
applied haphazardly to grant plenary power to administrative agencies
as well. Extensive scholarship discusses the role of plenary power in judicial
review of the political branches, but there is a dearth of literature
evaluating its role in administrative law. Yet the events of the past two
decades, including President Barack Obama’s executive mandate on
November 20, 2014, have revealed that the extension of plenary power to
administrative agencies subordinates constitutional principles to
statutory prescriptions or even administrative practice. As a result,
constitutional analysis of immigration decisions is prevented while
statutory review is allowed on the theory that courts must uphold plenary
power for the legislative branch by enforcing its statutes. Thus, courts
review immigration decisions primarily by enforcing statutes like the
1942 Administrative Procedures Act (APA), the 1952 Immigration
and Naturalization Act (INA), and the 1996 Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Together, these
enactments provide oversight and accountability to those charged with
administering immigration law in order to promote efficiency while
protecting individual rights and preserving constitutional separation of
powers. However, even those clearly constitutional objectives are often
accomplished under the guise of statutory interpretation in order to avoid
violating the plenary power doctrine. In a recent example, the 2014
executive mandate and subsequent memoranda of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) have been challenged as substantive
legislative rules under the APA that require notice-and-comment
procedures. Statutory review grounded in these enactments, but actually
based on constitutional principles, can only go so far in preserving
constitutional rights and preventing expansion of executive power.
Instead, plenary power should be disentangled from constitutional
judicial review of the political branches, and eliminated altogether in the
administrative state.
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INTRODUCTION
Pedro was stranded at the gas station where his truck’s battery
died. He knew that he had to figure something out soon, because
when he left home just a few minutes before, his wife and children
were excited at the prospect of a full day’s labor. A full day of work
meant a stress-free weekend that Pedro could enjoy with his family—
a rarity for Pedro, who usually spent weekends on the street corner
waiting for contractors who needed his services. But today was
different. Today, his friend had told him about an opportunity to work
in the oil fields only two hours away from Pedro’s home. And now,
today, Pedro was stranded at the gas station.
Pedro was a good man who cared for his family and did his best
to obey the law. As an undocumented worker in the United States, he
believed that he had been blessed to make it safely across the border
and cautiously avoided anything that would cause him to throw that
blessing away. As Pedro asked others at the gas station for help, he
struck up a conversation with other Mexican immigrants who
understood his plight. Pedro did not really understand recent changes
in immigration law, and the terms “DACA” and “DAPA” were foreign
to him. But Pedro knew one thing: he needed that piece of paper
authorizing him to work. For Pedro, that was salvation. Sure, a few of
his friends who had obtained work authorization still spent each day
scraping out a living, uncertain about the source of their next job,
paycheck, and meal. But he knew that he could not even hope for a
stable future without clearing that first hurdle. Pedro would do
anything to be authorized to work. 1
On the other hand, Arnulfo had a relatively sordid past. He had
turned his life around and was working hard to provide for his wife
and five-year-old son—both of whom are citizens—but his two DUI
convictions made it extremely difficult for him to ever obtain legal
permanent residency. He had been able to renew his Employment
Authorization Document each year and continue his job in
construction. That is, until March 2015, when his application for
renewal was denied due to his criminal record. Now Arnulfo had just
four weeks to either leave the country or officially enter the ranks of

1. Interview with immigrant, name changed for anonymity, in Provo, Utah (Dec.
19, 2014).
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the undocumented. He hoped that his boss, who had become his
friend, would never realize that the copy of Arnulfo’s work
authorization on file was about to expire. 2
It is difficult to imagine many stories where deportation becomes
an option that will not present heart-breaking humanitarian
difficulties. However, when the judiciary abdicates its role in reviewing
immigration decisions for constitutionality, policies and procedures
continue unchecked in such a way that aliens in the United States are
kept in permanent limbo, 3 wondering whether their case will be the
next case that is chosen for deportation based upon some immigration
official’s discretion.
The challenges are particularly difficult given the nature of the
laws that must be administered, now by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). Those laws are politically charged and substantially
impact the lives of individuals whose hardships in the face of
enforcement are often palpable. Families can be divided, homes left
empty, children abandoned, opportunities foreclosed, and liberty
rescinded. While these are all outcomes that are common in criminal
law enforcement, the DHS is faced with violations of the law that do
not seem as morally reprehensible as crimes like theft, robbery, or even
vandalism. 4 While deportation is perhaps not as liberty-restricting as
imprisonment, it often serves as a form of banishment and exile that
results in additional barriers to entry, making it even less likely for a
noncitizen to enter the United States legally after being removed. 5
There is a great deal of scholarship discussing plenary power and
prosecutorial discretion in immigration law. 6 However, there has never
been a thorough analysis of how the plenary power doctrine interacts
2. Interview with immigrant, name changed for anonymity, in Provo, Utah (Mar.
8, 2015).
3. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 298 (2010).
4. Improper entry is only a misdemeanor for first-time offenders, and unlawful presence
is not even a crime. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012); Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Illegal Reentry Under § 276
of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1326) of Alien Who Has Been Denied
Admission, Excluded, Deported, or Removed or Has Departed United States While Order of
Exclusion, Deportation, or Removal Is Outstanding, 177 A.L.R. FED. 459 (2002).
6. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 81–87 (2002); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990);
Wadhia, supra note 3.
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with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). More specifically,
given the subtly diminishing role of plenary power in immigration
cases and the not-so-subtle expansion of the administrative state, no
one has considered how APA review of immigration decisions is
appropriate even when constitutional review is prevented by
plenary power.
This Comment attempts to begin a conversation about questions
that are certain to take center stage in defining immigration law in the
years to come. It argues that immigration law, despite its tradition of
plenary power, cannot create a system that protects individual rights
while promoting administrative efficiency simply by reviewing
immigration decisions on statutory technicalities. Therefore, courts
should only continue to grant plenary power if they also provide
transparent constitutional review of immigration decisions, and that
plenary power should not be granted to administrative agencies. Part
I of this Comment reviews the history and evolution of immigration
law and judicial review. Part II outlines the history and structure of
the APA, and discusses the increase in executive mandates guiding
administrative action. Part III discusses the application of the APA to
executive action, analyzes its relationship to plenary power, and
evaluates related legal issues surrounding President Obama’s recent
executive mandate. Part IV makes a recommendation for redefining
the way that courts provide judicial review of immigration decisions.
I. HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION LAW AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Courts have used a number of different justifications for reviewing
exclusion orders, deportation proceedings, citizenship and
naturalization hearings, and numerous other actions that constitute
the field of immigration law. 7 The changing justifications for review
follow a pattern of deference to immigration officials tempered by
recognition of the basic rights of non-citizens within the United
States. 8 The plenary power doctrine significantly impacts every
instance of judicial review of an immigration decision. Thus, this Part

7. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 260 (5th ed. 2003).
8. Cf. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 1 (1984) (“Probably no other area of American law has been so radically insulated and
divergent from those fundamental norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure, and
judicial role that animate the rest of our legal system.”).
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first briefly describes the history and application of the plenary power
doctrine. Second, it discusses congressional enactments that have
formed the basis for judicial review of immigration law. Third, it
describes the waning influence of the plenary power doctrine and the
increasing use of prosecutorial discretion to make immigration
decisions. Finally, it reviews Congress’s 1996 immigration statute.
A. Plenary Power
Immigration law has traditionally enjoyed special treatment at a
constitutional level as a result of the plenary power doctrine. 9 The
doctrine took its most definite form in the 1889 Chinese Exclusion
Case, where the Court’s holding made it clear that the federal
government could regulate immigration virtually without the threat
of judicial review. 10 In that case, a Chinese immigrant, Chae Chan
Ping, had come to the United States under a treaty that provided for
unrestricted immigration from China. 11 Shortly thereafter, a new
treaty permitted limitations by the United States government on
Chinese immigration. Pursuant to that treaty, Congress banned
Chinese immigration for ten years in 1882 with a provision that
immigrants wishing to leave could obtain certificates for reentry. 12
However, a year after Chae Chan Ping obtained a certificate and
returned to China, Congress excluded even those that had certificates
of reentry in 1887. 13 The Court emphasized the federal government’s
power in immigration matters under the Constitution, and declined
to consider alien rights as limits on government action. In doing so, it
held that the federal government had the power “to exclude foreigners
from the country whenever, in its judgment, the public interests
require such exclusion.” 14
9. Motomura, supra note 6, at 547.
10. Id. at 551.
11. Id. at 550–51.
12. Id. at 551.
13. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 599–600 (1889); Motomura, supra
note 6, at 551.
14. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604–07 (1889) (“While under our Constitution and
form of government the great mass of local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United
States, in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation, invested
with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the
maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory.”); see also
Motomura, supra note 6, at 551–52.
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Since that case, courts have been hesitant to entertain
constitutional challenges about which aliens should be admitted or
expelled because the plenary power doctrine declares that Congress
and the executive branch have nearly exclusive and certainly very
broad authority over immigration matters. 15 Thus, “classical
immigration law,” as it has been termed, has resulted in a permissive
judicial approach to “restrictive nationalism,” even though it sharply
diverges from the liberal human rights philosophy that has dominated
other areas of the law. 16 The decision in the Chinese Exclusion Case was
based on a judicial preference for preserving the nation’s sovereignty. 17
Because of this preference, the persistent, gradual changes of the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries that led to a complete overhaul of
the administrative state did not fully impact judicial review of
immigration law. 18
Despite courts’ commitment to the plenary power doctrine,
judicial review has been permitted by application of the “Great Writ”
of habeas corpus in cases where the noncitizen seeking review is in
physical custody. 19 Enshrined in the Suspension Clause in Article I,
Section 9, Clause 2, the Constitution states: “The privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” 20 Nevertheless,
even though aliens have not been left completely without remedy in
immigration cases, the balance has traditionally tilted decidedly in
favor of the political branches and their plenary power to make
immigration decisions even when they negatively impact the rights
of noncitizens.
B. Congressional Oversight of Immigration Administration
Interestingly, while the Chinese Exclusion Cases and subsequent
case law reserved plenary power for the executive and legislative
branches, they did not provide extremely clear guidance for how that

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
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Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 600–09 (1889).
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U.S. CONST, art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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power should be allocated or implemented. 21 Thus, the nineteenth
century saw a proliferation of congressional enactments seeking to
define and regulate the roles of those involved in implementing the
law. In relatively quick succession, Congress enacted two extensive
regulatory regimes, the APA in 1946 22 and the INA in 1952, 23 which
dramatically changed the way the courts approached immigration
law. 24 Specifically, the INA provided for judicial review using the
procedures outlined in the APA for all cases arising under the INA. 25
In fact, some in Congress sought to exempt immigration decisions
from review under the APA entirely, 26 arguing that judicial oversight
would create a costly and cumbersome bureaucracy that was
inappropriate for the political and foreign affairs functions of
immigration law. 27 While no such exemption was codified, the
exemption exists for all practical purposes. In practice, the new
statutory regime under the INA required courts to balance a deeply
ingrained tradition of respecting the government’s plenary power with
a statutory command to review immigration decisions under the APA
and INA. The INA did not result in universal application of APA
review in the courts, which this comment argues is largely due to a
continued commitment to plenary power. However, immigration
cases increased as a percentage of the overall administrative caseload

21. Motomura, supra note 6, at 551.
22. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 and scattered sections of Title 5).
23. Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537).
24. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458, 515–16 (2009).
25. Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1968 (2000); see Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955)
(clarifying that the INA’s provision that deportation orders of the Attorney General should be
“final” only meant final for the administrative procedure); see also Immigration Act of 1917,
Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874, 890 (stating that the “[deportation] decision of the Secretary
of Labor shall be final”); Reorganization Plan of April 3, 1939, Reorganization Plan No. 76-5,
54 Stat. 1238 (transferring the Immigration and Naturalization Service from the Department of
Labor to the Department of Justice).
26. See H.R. 6652, 80th Cong. (1948) (as referred to H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary on
May 24, 1948) (exempting immigration decisions from the APA); 94 CONG. REC. 5655, 6374
(1948) (exempting immigration decisions from the APA was sent to the house judiciary
committee where it was reviewed but no further action was taken).
27. Schuck, supra note 8, at 32.
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by eight percent. 28 That growth has only heightened the challenges
that have always existed for those charged with implementing
immigration law under complex statutory regimes, now with the
added procedural requirements of the APA.
C. Prosecutorial Discretion and Plenary Power After the INA
In the decades since the APA and INA became law, the same
outcomes produced under the plenary power doctrine have been
achieved using prosecutorial discretion. While the term “prosecutorial
discretion” generally refers to executive decisions to allocate
enforcement resources and to elect not to prosecute certain categories
of offenses or individuals, the end result is similar to that of the plenary
power doctrine—namely, that courts are substantially limited in
reviewing the enforcement decisions of immigration officials. 29 The
INS, along with every other administrative agency, has always used
prosecutorial discretion in one form or another. However, there is no
record of when the INS began implementing a systematic internal
policy of prosecutorial discretion. 30
The practice came to light in 1974 in a lawsuit regarding the
deportation of British songwriter John Lennon. 31 In seeking to obtain
permanent residency in the United States, Lennon’s attorney used the
Freedom of Information Act to obtain the “blue sheets”—documents
used privately by administrators in the INS—that had previously been
unavailable to the public. 32 Those documents revealed a deferred
action policy by which the INS categorized individuals as “nonpriority” for removal where removal would be unconscionable. 33 That

28. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1015–16 (1990) (“[I]mmigration cases,
which comprised only 5.4% of the caseload in 1965, now account for 13.7% and comprise the
third largest group of cases (after the NLRB and MSPB cases).”).
29. See, e.g., Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 354 (1956) (explaining that the agency decision
to suspend deportation is a matter of grace and not a matter of right).
30. See, e.g., Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 42 (1976); see also Wadhia, supra note 3, at 246–48.
31. Lennon v. Richardson, 378 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
32. Wadhia, supra note 3, at 247–48.
33. Id. at 247–48.
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policy had been in place in the INS, unbeknownst to the public. 34 Due
to the publicity of the case and the novelty of the policy, courts quickly
split over whether such a policy could fly under the radar or should
instead be made public through notice-and-comment rulemaking. 35
Courts reviewing immigration decisions often distinguish between
substantive rights—like the right to enter the country or to receive
certain benefits that Congress can confer or deny—and procedural
rights—like the right to due process, which varies less with times,
conditions, or the will of Congress. 36 Notably, several circuit courts
issued opinions that recognized the substantive nature of the rights
provided by the INS’s categorization system. The Eighth Circuit in
David v. INS found that it was appropriate to defer the deportation of
an alien given the evidence presented, implying that “deferred action”
had reached the status of a substantive right to which aliens were
entitled if specific factual circumstances were demonstrated. 37 The
Ninth Circuit followed similar reasoning in Nicholas v. INS to find that
the INS’s policy for deferred action was clearly a substantive rule
because it operated for the benefit of aliens contesting deportation
rather than for the internal benefit of the INS. 38 While the Ninth
Circuit did not evaluate the need to follow the APA procedures, it
pointed out characteristics of the INS’s Operations Instructions that
would trigger those procedures in any other administrative setting. 39
In the decade following those cases, increased civil unrest
throughout the world led to greater numbers of foreigners seeking

34. Leon Wildes, The Operations Instructions of the Immigration Service: Internal Guides
or Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99, 101 (1979); Wadhia, supra note 3, at 246–48.
35. See Wildes, supra note 34, at 106 (“In accordance with a well-established principle
of administrative law, a written expression of ‘policy’ may be a rule and have the impact of a
rule, regardless of how the agency attempts to designate or describe it. The Operations
Instruction thus appears to be a firm rule. As such, it should probably be subject to the notice
and publication requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.”) (citing 5 U.S.C. §
553 (1976)).
36. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson,
J., dissenting) (“Procedural due process is more elemental and less flexible than substantive due
process. It yields less to the times, varies less with conditions, and defers much less to
legislative judgment.”).
37. David v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 548 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1977); see
Wadhia, supra note 3, at 249.
38. Nicholas v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 590 F.2d 802, 806–07 (9th
Cir. 1979).
39. Id.
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admission to the United States. 40 As a result, the national interest in
immigration law was high when the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Jean v. Nelson. 41 In that case, the Supreme Court evaluated
a constitutional challenge on behalf of Haitians seeking asylum in the
United States who claimed that the United States’ immigration
policies discriminated against Haitians on the basis of race and national
origin. 42 For the first time in many years, the facts in Jean seemed to
directly require analysis of constitutional issues as they pertained to
immigration law. For that reason, Jean provided the Court with the
perfect opportunity to provide clarity in an area of the law confused
between plenary power, congressional enactments and amendments,
and administrative flexibility through prosecutorial discretion.
However, the Supreme Court in Jean focused its analysis almost
entirely on statutory interpretation, conspicuously omitting the larger
questions about constitutional protection of noncitizens. 43 Justice
Marshall dissented, however, preferring to base the decision on the
constitutional grounds suggested by the facts and invalidate the policy
as discriminatory on the basis of national origin. 44 These kinds of
decisions have been described as the application of “phantom”
constitutional norms that allow the Court to avoid addressing
sensitive constitutional issues. 45 Courts have used these norms to
uphold statutory and regulatory requirements that are able to benefit
individuals subject to deportation proceedings on a case by case basis,
while gradually inserting constitutional arguments that would have
been precluded by plenary power. 46 As a result, the plenary power
doctrine has been weakened in practice, even though no explicit
judicial pronouncements have overturned it.
D. The 1996 Act
The most recent chapter in the story of congressional control and
oversight of immigration was written in 1996 when Congress passed
40. See Motomura, supra note 6, at 546.
41. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
42. Id. at 848.
43. See Motomura, supra note 6, at 547–48.
44. See Jean, 472 U.S. at 861 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[The regulations] do not, by
their terms, prohibit the consideration of race or national origin.”).
45. See Motomura, supra note 6, at 592–93.
46. Id. at 564–65.
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amendments to the INA, known as the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 47 and the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 48 In essence, AEDPA
limited the INA’s judicial review provision by barring review of final
deportation orders against aliens that had been convicted of crimes.49
Shortly thereafter, IIRIRA was enacted to similarly limit judicial
review, and to add several protections for immigration officials in
various discretionary capacities. 50 These acts had the cumulative effect
of increasing the efficiency of immigration officials by making more
resources available to them and reducing the likelihood of judicial
review. 51 However, the acts were also widely criticized for failing to
account for the rights of accused criminals and individuals subject to
“efficient” deportation without a mechanism for review by
the judiciary. 52
II. APPLYING THE APA TO EXECUTIVE MANDATES
In the past two decades, the executive branch has issued a number
of mandates related to immigration. 53 In 1987, President Reagan
announced that residency granted to aliens under the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 would be extended to the children

47. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 and
18 U.S.C.).
48. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
49. See Neuman, supra note 25, at 1975–76.
50. IIRIRA §§ 309(c)(I), 309 (c)(4), 110 Stat. at 3009-625, 3009-626-27; see Neuman,
supra note 25, at 1975–76.
51. See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1943 (2000).
52. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1893 (2000) (“If
criminal aliens are no longer here, and if they are prevented from returning, they are ipso facto
no longer part of our crime problem . . . [because they become] somebody else’s problem.”);
Morawetz, supra note 51, at 1943; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Policy and Politics of
Immigrant Rights, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 387 (2007).
53. See Danny Vinik, Reagan and Bush Acted Unilaterally on Immigration, Too—for the
REPUBLIC
(Nov.
19,
2014),
Same
Reason
That
Obama
Will,
NEW
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120334/obama-immigration-order-legal-bush-andreagans-were.
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of those new residents. 54 Later, in 1991, President George H.W. Bush
further extended residency to spouses of these new residents. 55 More
recently, in 2012, President Obama, through the DHS, announced
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). 56 The initiative was
met with significant backlash from conservatives in Congress 57 and on
the Supreme Court, 58 who claimed that the action was unprecedented
because, unlike Presidents Reagan and Bush’s actions, it was not based
on a preceding statutory grant of authority. But most importantly for
the purposes of this Comment, DACA initiated a renewed debate
surrounding the legitimacy of unilateral executive action in
immigration matters and the applicability of the APA in limiting those
actions. 59 In order to fully understand the interaction between
immigration mandates and the APA, one must be familiar with the
general background and history of the APA, as well as the specific
procedures that are required for certain administrative actions. The
following section first discusses the history and background of the
APA, then provides greater detail on the procedures required for
administrative rules, and finally, reviews the arguments for and against
applying the APA’s procedural requirements to DACA.
A. History and Background of the APA
In the midst of the Great Depression, when the United States
economy was on the brink of collapse and many questioned the
validity of free market principles, politicians of all political stripes—
both conservative and liberal—dramatically increased the number of

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Secretary Napolitano Announces Deferred Action Process
for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement Priorities, (June 15, 2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/15/secretary-napolitano-announces-deferred-actionprocess-young-people-who-are-low.
57. See, e.g., Letter from Lamar Smith, Chair, House Judiciary Comm., to John Morton,
Director, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigration and Customs Enforcement (July 3, 2012).
58. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2522 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of Immigration
Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255, 260 (2013).
59. See Greg Sargent, What the debate over Obama and deportations is really about, WASH.
POST: THE PLUM LINE (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plumline/wp/2014/08/13/what-the-debate-over-obama-and-deportations-is-really-about.
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administrative agencies in Washington. 60 With that increase, the need
for administrative reform became increasingly clear throughout the
first half of the twentieth century, and various bills were introduced to
limit administrative power. 61 However, most of those bills were
motivated, in large part, by those seeking to limit the policies of
whichever party controlled the agencies at that time. 62
Substantial disagreements on a variety of issues in administrative
law made it necessary to draft the Act’s provisions with enough
ambiguity to gain acceptance by a majority of the members of
Congress. 63 Thus, when the Act was passed in 1946, it provided little
guidance for interpreting the APA as it applies to immigration law. 64
Alternatively, an extensive legislative history was created as the
opposing sides in the administrative law debate issued dueling
interpretations in hopes of influencing future judicial decisions. 65
Unfortunately, those efforts created legislative records that are as
conflicted as the statute itself and the case law applying it. 66 Thus, a
considerable amount of ambiguity still exists regarding the application
of the APA.
The APA is generally understood to implement a set of procedures
in four different kinds of administrative actions: informal and formal
rulemaking, and informal and formal adjudications. 67 The lines
between formal adjudication, informal adjudication, and agency
discretion are not altogether clear from the text of the APA or
subsequent case law. 68 Generally speaking, formal adjudications can be
defined as the application of the statute that an agency is charged to

60. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1561–62 (1996) (noting that in the first
three decades of the twentieth century, even as “conservatives dominated national politics,
the number of agencies doubled,” and that the growth “quickened under Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s administration”).
61. Id. at 1565–80.
62. Id.at 1567.
63. Id. at 1662–64.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1663.
66. Id. at 1665–66.
67. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 305 (7th ed. 2016).
68. Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 489 (1986).
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administer in accordance with agency policy to a specific set of facts.69
Section 554 of the APA sets forth the requirements for notice that
must be given to affected parties and procedures that must be
followed in formal adjudication hearings. 70 Informal adjudications, on
the other hand, include the application and development of agency
practices, and therefore do not include the same hearing requirements,
such as the application of law to facts. 71
Perhaps most importantly for this Comment, section 553 outlines
the procedures for rulemaking. 72 It first lists exceptions to the
procedures for the “military or foreign affairs function of the United
States,” and for matters “relating to agency management or personnel
or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.” 73 Section
553 also specifically states that these procedural requirements do not
apply to “interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice.” 74 Accordingly, the
procedures in section 553 apply to informal rulemaking that creates
generally applicable rules. Informal rulemaking has been broadly
construed by courts to include even narrow decisions about when to
grant licenses. 75 Formal rulemaking, on the other hand, is subject to
sections 556 and 557, which set forth the hearing requirements when
a statute requires the rules to be made “on the record” and “after
opportunity for an agency hearing.” 76 Thus, formal rulemaking
procedures are rarely reviewed by courts, while cases considering the
procedures used for more common informal rulemaking abound.
In terms of judicial review, the APA requires that courts “compel
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” and set

69. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 481 (categorizing three types of decisions requiring agency
judgment: (1) every day decisions made by agencies that consist of “basic fact determinations
that recur in case after case and infrequently raise questions of policy or law,” (2) formal
adjudications involving a “mix of particularized considerations of past conduct with
considerations of agency policy,” and (3) informal adjudications that involve the application and
development of agency practices).
70. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 553.
73. Id. § 553(a)(1)–(a)(2).
74. Id. § 553(b)(3)(A).
75. See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 526–27, 546–48 (1978).
76. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 556, 557.
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aside agency decisions that are “arbitrary [and] capricious.” 77 Given
that this provision was enacted in 1946, the drafters of the APA likely
did not intend it to refer to the kind of “arbitrary and capricious”
review that developed along with other judicial innovations in the
1960s, but it has nevertheless been applied accordingly. 78 Some
commentators discuss evidence that Congress did not intend to create
the high degree of judicial deference that has been afforded to
agencies. 79 Despite this general trend toward deference, or perhaps in
part because of it, much of the case law surrounding the APA
remains ambiguous.
The APA’s procedural requirements have been used to invalidate
agency actions that fail to implement proper procedures required by
the APA in conjunction with the statute that grants power to the
agency. Initially, courts reviewed administrative action under two
standards: In cases where the court concluded that Congress intended
a specific result but simply expressed that result unclearly, the court
would review the administrative decision de novo. 80 However, in cases
where the statute made it clear that Congress intended for the agencies
to have discretion in administering the statute, courts gave deference
to the agency’s interpretation. 81 That dual approach changed when the
Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, which provided a
two-step approach to reviewing administrative decisions. 82
First, courts are to evaluate whether Congress spoke directly to
the question at issue. 83 If so, the question should be resolved according
to Congress’s pronouncement. 84 If not, courts move to the second
step, where they evaluate whether the agency’s construction was

77. Id. § 706(1)–(2)(A) (1994); see, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 403 (1971).
78. Peter L. Strauss, Changing Times: The APA at Fifty, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1389,
1401 (1996).
79. Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA.
L. REV. 271, 289–90 (1986).
80. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 516 (1989).
81. Id.
82. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
83. Id. at 842; see also Scalia, supra note 80, at 511–12.
84. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; see also Scalia, supra note 80, at 511–12.
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reasonable and permissible within the limits of the statute. 85 The
Court has held that Chevron applies to decisions made by the Board
of Immigrations Appeals, although courts continue to recognize
exceptions due to the political and foreign-relations functions of
immigration officials. 86 In essence, those exceptions represent an
extension of the plenary power doctrine that allows immigration
officials in many cases to avoid procedural review under the APA.87
Justice Scalia criticized the APA’s approach to judicial review in
general, arguing that under both the pre-Chevron and the postChevron approaches the outcome generally depends on how likely a
judge is to find ambiguity in a statute or to characterize ambiguity as
a license to use discretion. 88
However, a few key provisions of the APA have been definitively
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court so as to provide clear guidance
in a limited number of circumstances. One provision that has been
widely and consistently interpreted is the requirement that, in order
for a rule to be subject to formal rulemaking under sections 556 and
557, the statutory mandate for the agency action must use the phrase
“on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” 89 This bright
line rule has allowed Congress to clearly indicate when it wishes to
require formal rulemaking procedures. As a result, few statutes require
formal rulemaking procedures because congressional majorities
enacting new laws invariably consider them to be urgent solutions
requiring flexible and efficient application.
A second relevant point of administrative law that is abundantly
clear, is that reviewing courts cannot add procedural requirements to
agency actions beyond those clearly outlined in the APA. 90 These two

85. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also Scalia, supra note 80, at 511–12.
86. See Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 531–32 (2003).
87. Id. at 542–43.
88. Scalia, supra note 80, at 514–16.
89. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1973) (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012)); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative
Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1785 (2007) (“The Court said that it would not require
agencies to use formal procedures unless Congress . . . us[ed] in the organic statute the same
magic words that trigger formal procedures in the APA: ‘[O]n the record after opportunity for
an agency hearing.’” (second alteration in original)).
90. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
524 (1978).
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provisions play an important role in defining the administrative nature
of executive actions and, at the same time, limiting the power of courts
to impose greater procedural constraints on those actions.
B. Administrative Rules and Notice-and-Comment Procedures
The APA requires agencies to follow very specific procedural
requirements in creating rules that are generally applicable. The
purpose of these requirements is to improve the quality of rulemaking
by agencies that are otherwise largely unchecked by and
unaccountable to members of the voting public or their
representatives in Congress. 91 The APA clearly identifies distinct
procedural requirements for two categories of rulemaking: formal
rules requiring the creation of a record in a formal hearing, and
informal rules that are also generally applicable but can be issued using
notice-and-comment rulemaking. 92
The most commonly applied test for classifying agency action as a
rule and determining which APA procedures are required comes from
the D.C. Circuit, which evaluates (1) “whether the rule is legally
binding or leaves the agency free to exercise its discretion,” (2) “how
the Agency has characterized the rule,” (3) “the language used in the
rule itself,” and (4) “whether the rule has been published in the
Federal Register or Code of Federal Regulations.” 93 In order to
determine whether new guidance to an agency limits the agency’s
discretion, courts look at whether the agency frequently exercised
discretion contrary to the agency guidance provided. 94
Sections 553(b) and (c) outline the procedural requirements for
notice-and-comment rulemaking. 95 First, the agency must provide
general notice by publishing the proposed rule in the Federal Register,
including a description of the rule making proceedings, an explanation
of the statutory basis for the rule, and “the terms or substance of the

91. See Shepherd, supra note 60, at 1565–80.
92. LAWSON, supra note 67, at 309.
93. Gilbert, supra note 58, at 290.
94. Am. Bus. Ass’n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting
Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 666–67 (D.C.
Cir. 1978)) (accepting a so-called policy statement that in purpose or effect “narrowly limits
administrative discretion . . . [as] a binding rule of substantive law”).
95. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012).
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proposed rule.” 96 Once notice is given, the agency must give
“interested persons” the opportunity to comment, then consider the
relevant matter, and finally “incorporate in the rules adopted a concise
general statement of their basis and purpose.” 97 While some have
criticized these procedures for failing to provide a mechanism for
meaningful oversight and democratic participation, 98 others have
found the process to be overly onerous given the need for flexibility
in administrative practice. 99 However, because the mandates included
in DACA and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful
Permanent Residents (DAPA) are generally applicable, and because
they do not use the specific language required for formal rulemaking,
they are subject to challenge on the basis of procedural inadequacy
because they failed to implement required notice-andcomment procedures.
C. DACA and the APA
When DACA was implemented in 2012, the agencies charged
with applying it did not follow the notice-and-comment procedures
outlined in the APA. 100 The memorandum directing the DHS to
implement the deferred action policy was issued by Secretary Janet
Napolitano on June 15, 2012. It stated that “ICE is directed to begin
implementing this process within 60 days of the date of this
memorandum.” 101 Exactly sixty days after the memorandum was
distributed, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
which focuses exclusively on the administration of immigration benefit

96. Id. § 553(b).
97. Id. § 553(c).
98. Strauss, supra note 78, at 1405 (arguing that these procedures are “little more than a
consultative process for public presentation of information and views, loosely comparable to
what might be employed by a congressional committee”).
99. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 483 (“A growing consensus now exists that informal
rulemaking has become too formal and thus too cumbersome and time-consuming . . . .”).
100. Gilbert, supra note 58, at 289 (citing Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of
Homeland Sec., on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came
to the United States as Children, to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border
Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., & John Morton, Dir.,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-aschildren.pdf).
101. Gilbert, supra note 58, at 289; Napolitano, supra note 100, at 2.
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applications, published the only DACA-related rule subject to noticeand-comment rulemaking in the Federal Register. 102 However, rather
than inviting comments on the new agency policy and criteria for
handling individual immigration cases, the proposed rule only invited
comments regarding the wording of the DACA application form. 103
The lack of procedure in implementing immigration law has been
criticized by practitioners 104 and challenged by attorneys and officials
at ICE. 105 The DHS justified the lack of APA procedures as proper
because the statements promulgating DACA were “general statements
of policy” rather than binding rules that trigger the APA. 106 Leaders
within the DHS characterized DACA as a thoughtful way to exercise
prosecutorial discretion more consistently. 107 In her directive to the
DHS, Secretary Napolitano explained that her memorandum
“confer[red] no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to
citizenship.” 108 Critics, on the other hand, have made the opposite
claim; an executive mandate that prioritizes immigration enforcement
actually eliminates prosecutorial discretion by limiting the choices that
can be made by those actually on the ground prosecuting those that
violate immigration law. 109 While this Comment does not claim to
resolve the complex debate about whether executive actions provide
substantive rights, it does assert that a contributing factor to the
complexity is the inability of courts to analyze the APA alongside

102. Comment
Request,
77
Fed.
Reg.
49451
(Aug.
16,
2012),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-08-16/pdf/2012-20247.pdf.
103. Id.
104. See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Questions
and Answers: USCIS Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n (AILA) Meeting 2–3 (Mar. 19, 2009),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/nativedocuments/aila_aao_qa_19march09.pdf.
105. Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O (N.D. Tex. Aug.
23, 2012).
106. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012). In Am. Bus. Ass’n v. United States, 627 F.2d
525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the D.C. Circuit cites to the Attorney General’s Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act (1947), which defines “general statements of policy” under the
APA as “statements issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which
the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power.” Id.
107. David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The Legal
and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J.F. 167, 168 (2012)
(explaining that the DHS “justifies DACA as a systematic and thoughtful way of exercising
prosecutorial discretion”).
108. Napolitano, supra note 100, at 3.
109. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Opinion, The ‘DREAM’ order isn’t legal, N.Y. POST (June
22, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2012/06/22/the-dream-order-isnt-legal/.
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constitutional principles while respecting plenary power in the
political branches.
III. THE APA AND PLENARY POWER: INSIGHTS FOR DAPA
There has been considerable debate regarding what, if any,
administrative procedures should be applied to agency actions related
to immigration. While the tradition of plenary power plays a
significant role in muddying the already murky waters of the APA, it
also explains the uniqueness of APA review in immigration decisions.
This Part first discusses how the APA would be applied to recent
executive actions related to immigration if plenary power were not
involved. It then discusses the impact of plenary power on the APA
and evaluates how courts have reviewed administrative decisions in
immigrations cases. Third, it specifically discusses the facts
surrounding President Obama’s 2014 executive mandate and applies
the previous discussion to those facts. Finally, it outlines the
administrative and immigration law issues underlying an important
ruling by the federal district court, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
and the U.S. Supreme Court in Texas v. United States.
A. Immigration Actions under the APA
Every type of immigration action can be categorized as an action
under the APA. Decisions regarding agency practice or internal
procedures would likely be categorized as informal adjudication, while
decisions that set policies for granting or denying petitions based on
specific facts are likely informal rules. While the labels or titles used by
agencies in taking certain actions are a factor in determining how the
agency itself characterized the rule, they are generally insufficient to
establish the kind of action that has been taken. 110 For example, after
the Ninth Circuit invalidated the INS’s deferral policy in Nicholas, the
INS sought to avoid meaningful review of internal policies similar to
the Operations Instructions by clearly stating its intent to establish
internal guidelines for administrative decision making and not binding

110. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145, 1153 (5th Cir. 1984)
(“[T]he substantial impact test is the primary means by which [we] look beyond the label
‘procedural’ to determine whether a rule is of the type Congress thought appropriate for
public participation.”).
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rules with future effect. 111 By responding with little more than an
updated label for its Operations Instructions, the INA did not resolve
the concerns surrounding the “binding effect” of those instructions
that made them substantially similar to rules under the APA. 112 After
all, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he particular label placed
upon [agency action] by the Commission is not necessarily conclusive,
for it is the substance of what the Commission has purported to do
and has done which is decisive.” 113
Far more important than the label given to the action, then, is its
substance, or the practical outcomes produced by the action. The
focus on substance is supplemented by a few bright line rules, such as
the clear pronouncement that an agency action is not a formal rule if
the statutory basis for the rule is not implemented “on the record and
after opportunity for an agency hearing.” 114 Thus, executive mandates
that derive their authority from the INA would only be formal rules if
they met those requirements. 115
Executive mandates also do not appear to be adjudications because
they do not merely apply a policy or statute to a singular set of facts.
Instead, executive mandates issue specific, broadly applicable guidance
to agencies, with which they are expected to conform. There is not yet
sufficient data to evaluate whether agencies have retained their
discretion to act contrary to the 2014 executive mandate. Given the
broad definition of informal rulemaking, courts are likely to find that
the administrative policies put in place by executive actions require
notice-and-comment procedures.
B. The Impact of Plenary Power on APA Review
Plenary power has served to limit judicial review of immigration
decisions. The APA, on the other hand, has provided an avenue for
review of immigration decisions by administrative agencies. In light of
the provisions of the APA discussed in Part II, the continued

111. Wadhia, supra note 3, at 282.
112. Nicholas v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 590 F.2d 802, 806–07 (9th
Cir. 1979).
113. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942).
114. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
115. See id.
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application of the plenary power doctrine raises interesting questions
about the doctrine’s purpose, scope, and role in administrative law.
The purpose of plenary power and the APA in judicial review is to
allow the executive and legislative branches to take necessary steps to
ensure the security of the nation and enforcement of immigration
policies. 116 However, given the APA’s purpose to conform
administrative actions to the underlying congressional mandates, the
impact of plenary power is to allow greater flexibility for agencies and
limited oversight by Congress and the President. 117 In other words, a
doctrine that was created expressly to reserve power for the executive
and legislative branch has legitimized power for what has been called
the “headless Fourth Branch” of government, while actually limiting
the political branches’ ability to control the agencies. 118 In practice,
this has served to severely limit judicial protection of noncitizen rights
where efficiency-driven agencies and a politically-motivated Congress
continue to enforce a system of “restrictive nationalism.” 119
The APA was designed to resolve a tension between the mandates
of the legislative branch and the need for flexibility in the
administrative agencies of the executive branch, 120 not to enable
administrative agencies to act independently, without direction from
executive guidance or legislative mandates. 121 This becomes extremely
important given that, in practice, much of the work of the executive
branch is performed by administrative agencies. Unfortunately, the
practical impact of plenary power is to prevent courts from reviewing
administrative decisions so that agencies are insulated from both
executive and legislative oversight. Courts either wholly refuse to
review actions that fit under the umbrella of plenary power or defer to
reasonable agency interpretations, requiring Congress to take the
legislative pains of amending the statute or enacting new laws rather
than simply enforcing the statutes to override agency practice.

116. Motomura, supra note 6, at 547.
117. Id. Contra Sunstein, supra note 79, at 280.
118. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 921 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
119. Schuck, supra note 8, at 3–4; see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976)
(stating that plenary power can be used to “make[] rules that would be unacceptable if applied
to citizens”).
120. See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 60, at 1562–63; Sunstein, supra note 79, at 279–80.
121. See Shapiro, supra note 68, at 458–59.
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C. President Obama’s 2014 Executive Mandate and Texas v.
United States
President Obama’s recent executive actions raise two questions:
(1) whether the President’s executive guidance to administrative
agencies is subject to APA review, and (2) whether the President’s
plenary power in immigration law prevents those actions from
invalidation under the APA.
1. Does the APA apply to an executive mandate?
Given that recent executive actions have not followed the
procedures outlined by the APA and were administered by agencies,
they could be invalidated by a court that finds they are subject to the
APA. However, APA review may be precluded by the reservation of
plenary power for the political branches.
First, then, it is helpful to understand how the APA is generally
applied to executive actions. Before President Obama issued his first
immigration mandate for DREAM Act beneficiaries, he received a
letter from ninety-five law professors stating that the contemplated
action was a constitutional use of executive power. 122 However, that
letter did not address the question of whether the APA applies to
executive action. 123 The missing analysis that is most interesting on
that point is whether an executive mandate, issued by a popularly
elected President, obviates the necessity for administrative procedures
in issuing a mandate.
The APA does not contemplate any specific exception for
executive mandates. However, the historical purpose of the APA to
provide oversight to those charged with administering congressional
enactments is insightful. Where the President issues a mandate because
of Congress’s failure to act, as was the case in 2014, 124 it would not be
surprising to find that portions of that mandate run contrary to the
intent of Congress. Interestingly, President Obama and members of
his cabinet expressed their public support for the DREAM Act along

122. See Letter from Immigration Law Professors to President Obama (May 28, 2012),
https://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/documents/ExecutiveAuthorityForDREAMRelief28May201
2withSignatures.pdf.
123. See id.
124. Gilbert, supra note 58, at 264–65.
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with an assertion that it was up to Congress to pass a law. 125 DHS
Secretary Janet Napolitano even responded to a letter urging executive
action to “insist that as sympathetic as they were, no category of
Prosecutorial Discretion . . . would be employed for groups
of individuals.” 126
Even though a popularly elected President has clear democratic
legitimacy, executive action must still fit within the dictates of the
statutes that the President is required to execute. When the executive
mandate is specifically issued to administrative agencies with the
charge to apply it consistently, the APA is implicated because the
substance of such a mandate is the same as an administrative rule. As
important and valid as the motives for such an action may be, the APA
should not be used when convenient to invalidate actions of the
opposing side. Rather, the APA should be applied in a way that reflects
one of the key purposes for its enactment—to protect the separate
functions of the three branches of government.
Analysis of whether and in what way the APA should be applied
must begin with an understanding of the background and application
of President Obama’s widely publicized executive mandate,
announced on November 20, 2014. 127 Immediately after the
announcement, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson issued a number of
memoranda to various departments requiring compliance with the
newly announced measures. 128 Secretary Johnson’s memorandum to
both León Rodríguez, Director of the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), and Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting
Director of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), required modernization of the employment-based visa system,
reformed training for foreign graduate students, and increased
promotion of research and development by foreigners in the United

125. Id.
126. Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the
Vexing Case(s) of DREAM Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 463, 473 (2012); see also
Gilbert, supra note 58, at 265 n.44.
127. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., and Thomas S. Winkowski,
Acting
Dir.,
U.S.
Immigration
and
Customs
Enf’t
(Nov.
20,
2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_business_actions.pdf
[hereinafter First Johnson Memorandum]; DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., supra note 56.
128. See First Johnson Memorandum, supra note 127.
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States. 129 Secretary Johnson sent a second memorandum to each of
those agencies, this time including R. Gil Kerlikowske, Commissioner
of the United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”). 130 That
memorandum “[r]emov[ed] the age cap” from DACA, extended
“renewal[s] and work authorization to three years,” “[a]djust[ed] the
date-of-entry requirements,” and expanded deferred action overall.131
In a third memorandum sent to the USCIS, ICE, the CBP, and Alan
D. Bersin, Acting Assistant Secretary for Policy, Secretary Johnson
issued “new policies for the apprehension, detention, and removal of
aliens in this country” by focusing first on “threats to national security,
border security, and public safety,” second on “misdemeanants and
new immigration violators,” and third on “other immigration
violations.” 132 Interestingly, that memorandum leaves significant
discretion in the hands of DHS personnel even for Priority 1
individuals by stating that they
must be prioritized for removal unless they qualify for asylum or
other form of relief under our laws, or unless, in the judgment of an
ICE Field Office Director, CBP Sector Chief, or CBP Director of
Field Operations, there are compelling and exceptional factors that
clearly indicate the alien is not a threat to national security, border
security, or public safety and should not therefore be an enforcement
priority. 133

These memoranda will likely be subject to the same criticisms as
DACA given the expanded reach of their policies. Before discussing
what these actions imply about judicial review of immigration
decisions, a review of the current litigation in which various states are
seeking to invalidate DAPA is in order.

129. Id.
130. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting
Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs and
Border Prot. 3–4 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [hereinafter Second Johnson Memorandum].
131. Id.
132. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, et. al. 1, 3–4 (Nov. 20,
2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_
discretion.pdf [hereinafter Third Johnson Memorandum].
133. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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In February of 2015, a Federal District Judge in Texas ruled that
President Obama’s executive action violated the APA by failing to use
notice-and-comment procedures. 134 Judge Andrew S. Hanen, an
appointee of President George W. Bush, in an eighty-seven page
opinion held that the executive mandate was unlawful because it
violated the APA. 135 The DHS memoranda discussed in this Section
created a new program that deferred the deportation proceedings of
“four to five million individuals residing illegally in the United
States.” 136 In response, the state of Texas and twenty-five other states
filed this case in an attempt to enjoin the implementation of that
program. 137 Many parties interested in the lawsuit attempted to
intervene, and many filed amicus curiae briefs, but the judge ruled that
the parties to the lawsuit adequately represented the interests of the
parties and that granting any of the motions to intervene would
unduly delay the progress of the litigation. 138
The opinion considered three issues: “(1) whether the States had
standing to bring the case, (2) whether the DHS has the discretion to
implement DAPA, and (3) whether DAPA is constitutional, comports
with existing laws, and was legally adopted.” 139 The second and third
issues are discussed here as an example of the most recent application
of the plenary power doctrine to avoid constitutional questions but
rule on statutory grounds with the same effect.
2. DHS discretion and the constitutionality of DAPA
On those issues, the court explained that the role of the judiciary
is not to second-guess the priorities set by the secretaries of
administrative agencies. 140 Specifically, the court discusses three
reasons behind the general judicial practice of not overturning
decisions about non-enforcement: first, because those decisions
involve considerations that are within the agency’s expertise; second,
a decision not to act does not bring to bear the “agency’s coercive
134. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134
(5th Cir.), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
135. Id. at 677.
136. Id. at 607.
137. Id. at 604.
138. Id. at 608.
139. Id. at 607.
140. Id. at 644.
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powers” and therefore does not require protection by the courts;
third, and finally, a decision not to act by an agency is similar to “a
prosecutor’s decision to not indict.” 141 Thus, the court found that
Secretary Johnson’s priority-setting decisions were discretionary and
fit within the executive branch’s purview “to the extent that they d[id]
not violate any statute or the Constitution.” 142 However, the court
recognized that the executive branch does not have the power to take
actions that are legislative in nature. 143
Decisions about how to marshal DHS resources are discretionary
and within the authority of the executive branch insofar as they do not
violate the Constitution or any statute. 144 However, the States argued
that DAPA did not merely allocate resources, but implemented final
agency action in the form of a legislative rule. 145 According to the
court’s standing analysis, not only were the plaintiffs adversely affected
such that they were “injured in fact,” 146 but they fit within the zone of
interests because “DAPA . . . clearly contravenes the express terms of
the INA.” 147
The court also found that the agency action was within the zone
of interests even though the agency claimed it was exempt by pointing
to a statute that prohibited acts that were “committed to agency
discretion by law.” 148 The Supreme Court had interpreted that
exception narrowly in circumstances where the statute had such broad
terms that it could not apply to specific cases, and outlined two
exceptions: (1) where Congress clearly seeks to preclude judicial
review, and (2) where no meaningful standard is available to perform
judicial review. 149 The court acknowledged that this precedent
exempted decisions by agencies not to enforce a statute, pointing out
that there is a rebuttable presumption that non-action is not
reviewable. 150 However, the court cited to Heckler, which held that

141.
142.
142.
143.
144.
146.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 645.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 645–46.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 652.
Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012)).
Id. (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)).
Id. at 653 (emphasis added) (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831).
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when the substantive statute “provide[s] guidelines for the agency to
follow in exercising its enforcement powers,” the presumption against
judicial review is rebutted. 151 Even so, the court found that the facts
of this case are different than Heckler, because non-enforcement in
this context granted deferment to an entire class of aliens, making it
more like an affirmative action than inaction. 152 Thus, the Supreme
Court’s concerns about the lack of a meaningful judicial standard were
not applicable to DAPA. 153 The court explained that DAPA does not
constitute inaction against an individual, but a widespread program
that has a history of application as a binding affirmative rule rather
than a resource-allocation decision, leading to inaction on the part of
an agency. 154
Thus, the court found that DAPA is much more than nonenforcement; rather, it is a prohibition on agencies’ ability to comply
with the law, and a provision of three years’ immunity along with other
benefits that come with legal presence in the United States. 155 Heckler
was not meant to apply in cases where agencies create new programs
that provide substantial benefits that would otherwise be
unobtainable. 156 Even if the presumption does apply to DAPA, the
court found, the presumption is rebutted under the standard set out
in Heckler because the actions “provide guidelines for the agency to
follow in exercising its enforcement powers.” 157
The court also found that the INA provides clear guidance that
actually circumscribes agency discretion in this case. 158 The INA
defines which individuals are subject to a deportation proceeding,159
and establishes the burden of proof on the alien to demonstrate
“clearly and beyond doubt” that he or she is entitled to be admitted.160
Thus, the court held that no statute gives the DHS the power to

150.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
157.
158.
159.
160.
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Id. at 656 (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832–33).
Id.
Id. at 655–56 (citing Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 655–56 (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832).
Id. at 656–57.
Id. at 657.
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (2012)).
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provide additional legal benefits to aliens. 161 The INA does provide
two general grants of discretion: first, an administrative grant allowing
actions necessary for carrying out the Secretary’s authority, and
second, a provision listing the Under Secretary’s responsibilities to
prevent terrorism, secure borders, establish rules governing visas, and
establish national immigration enforcement policies and priorities.162
While those provisions grant general authority, the court found that
they do not include aliens that have already entered the United States
and are currently here illegally. 163 Thus, the court held that while the
DHS can set priorities and allocate resources, it cannot award legal
presence to a category that Congress has said can be deported because
to do so runs directly contrary to the mandate of the statute. 164
D. Fifth Circuit Court and U.S. Supreme Court Decision
The United States appealed the preliminary injunction issued by
Judge Hanen to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. 165 The Fifth Circuit issued its decision on November 9, 2015,
denying the United States’ motion to stay the preliminary injunction,
thereby preventing the implementation of DAPA until the appeal
could be resolved regarding the preliminary injunction. 166
After oral arguments and briefing, two of the three-judge panel
ruled to affirm the district court’s ruling, and to send the case back to
the district court to proceed with the trial. 167 Judges Elrod and Smith,
in the Fifth Circuit opinion, addressed three issues, 168 which provide
insight into the relationship between plenary power granting
executive discretion and oversight of the administrative state.
First, the Fifth Circuit found that Texas had standing because
DAPA effectively changed the status of certain categories of
undocumented aliens by declaring them lawfully present in the United

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 660–61.
165. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), as revised (Nov. 25, 2015),
aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
166. Id. at 146.
167. Id. at 147–49.
168. Id.
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States. 169 Aliens granted “lawful presence,” a status that is revocable at
any time, are eligible for certain federal and state benefits, 170 including
the issuance of drivers’ licenses to individuals subject to deferred
action under DAPA. 171 The Fifth Circuit held that Texas satisfied the
requirements for standing because the state suffered an injury that was
“fairly traceable” to DAPA, which would “enable beneficiaries to
apply for driver’s licenses,” causing a demonstrable financial harm to
the state. 172 While the federal government argued that such an
incremental theory of standing is flawed because it has no conceivable
limits, the majority of the Fifth Circuit explained that the same
problem existed in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 173 and that courts could find other ways to “cabin policy
disagreements masquerading as legal claims.” 174 Moreover, the Fifth
Circuit held that Texas had satisfied the APA requirement that its
asserted interests fit within “the zone of interests to be protected and
regulated by the statute.” 175 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Texas
relied on the congressional guarantee that it would not have to spend
“millions of dollars to subsidize driver’s licenses or chang[e] its
statutes” without at least having the opportunity to go through
notice-and-comment procedures. 176 While the government argued
that review of the agency action should not be permitted even if the
plaintiffs had standing because the statute expressly prohibits review
of deportation decisions, the Fifth Circuit held that the prohibition in
the statute did not apply broadly to all deportation claims. 177

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 156–60.
173. Id. at 161–62 (citing Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497,
518 (2007)).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 162–63 (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), which states that “no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or
action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien under this chapter”).
176. Id. at 163.
177. Id. at 164; see Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,
482 (1999) (rejecting the notion that “the unexamined assumption that § 1252(g) covers the
universe of deportation claims—that it is a sort of ‘zipper’ clause that says ‘no judicial review in
deportation cases unless this section provides judicial review’”).
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Second, Judges Elrod and Smith found that the executive order
initiating DAPA violated the APA because it did not follow noticeand-comment rulemaking procedures. 178 The Fifth Circuit concluded
that DAPA did not “genuinely leave the agency and its employees free
to exercise discretion” 179 because the requirements of DAPA were so
detailed and specific that no evidence was presented of cases that had
been denied for discretionary reasons. 180 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit
found that DAPA was not a rule “of agency organization, procedure,
or practice.” 181 In summary, the court concluded that there was a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the procedural claim
that notice-and-comment rulemaking should have been used before
implementing DAPA. 182
Third, the majority found that the INA did not permit deferred
action in the form of DAPA. 183 The court found that “Congress ha[d]
‘directly addressed the precise question at issue,” because the INA
prescribes how parents may derive an immigration classification on the
basis of their child’s status, foreclosing DAPA because Congress had
clearly codified a specific and careful plan. 184 For that reason, the Fifth
Circuit held that DAPA was properly enjoined because it was
“manifestly contrary to the statute.” 185
The United States appealed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling to the eightmember U.S. Supreme Court. The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s
decision on June 23, 2016, stating only that the “judgment is affirmed
by an equally divided Court.” 186 Notably, the Supreme Court asked
for briefing on whether the executive branch violated the take care
clause, which requires the President to “take Care” 187 that the laws are
faithfully executed. 188 This was a new constitutional question that was
178. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 171–72.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 176–77.
182. Id. at 177.
183. Id. at 147–49.
184. Id. at 186.
185. Id.
186. United States v. Texas, 579 U.S. ___ (2016).
187. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
188. Garrett Epps, Will the U.S. Supreme Court Tell Obama to ‘Take Care’?, ATLANTIC
(Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/supreme-courtunited-states-texas/425031/.

1593

6.MCCARTY.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/18/2017 9:25 AM

2016

not addressed by the Fifth Circuit, demonstrating that at least some
of the justices on the Supreme Court considered the issue important.
E. Implications of United States v. Texas
Given the history and background of immigration and
administrative law discussed above, this case has the potential to
significantly impact the manner and method of judicial review of
immigration decisions. The federal government was found to have
clearly implemented a substantive rule that was legislative in nature
without following the procedures required by the APA. 189 The
injunction put a temporary stop to the extension of legal presence to
four million individuals that would qualify for deferred action under
DAPA and prevented three amendments to the two-and-a-half-yearold DACA program. 190 Interestingly, Judge Hanen explicitly declined
to enjoin the implementation of the DACA program itself, which was
instituted in 2012. 191 Moreover, neither the District Court nor the
Fifth Circuit opinion holds that President Obama’s use of the
executive mandate was, in and of itself, unlawful, but that the
application of new rules by the DHS in order to comply with its
understanding of that mandate was unlawful because it failed to
comply with APA-required notice-and-comment procedures. 192
Notice-and-comment procedures exist to ensure that the public
has the opportunity to check administrative agencies in in the
implementation of their administrative power. 193 Some administrators
have argued that their job is not to be familiar with the law and to
administer it to the letter, but to understand the underlying purposes
of the law and to ensure that those purposes are accomplished.194
However, the APA sought to reduce the extent to which that kind of

189. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d
134 (5th Cir.), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Texas v. United States,
809 F.3d 134, 170–77 (5th Cir. 2015).
190. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 at 677–78; Texas, 809 F.3d 134 at 189–90.
191. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 at 608–10.
192. Id. at 653–66; Texas, 809 F.3d 134 at 171–73.
193. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 75 (1938).
194. Id. (“One of the ablest administrators that it was my good fortune to know, I believe,
never read, at least more than casually, the statutes that he translated into reality. He assumed
that they gave him power to deal with the broad problems of an industry and, upon that
understanding, he sought his own solutions.”).
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rulemaking and decision making can occur without oversight by the
citizens and the organizations that are impacted by it. 195 Thus, by
failing to use notice-and-comment procedures, agencies essentially
reduce their democratic legitimacy. For those reasons, the Texas
decision touched upon issues that have deep constitutional and
structural implications for the future of immigration law.
The assertion by Judge Hanen that DAPA was a rule because it
applied categorically is interesting given that prosecutorial discretion
allows for decisions not to prosecute “at both a categorical and an
individual level.” 196
In the Fifth Circuit opinion, Judges Elrod and Smith identified
the competing values as well, finding that on balance DAPA failed to
follow the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures in place to
preserve those values. 197 By completely eliminating the agencies’
discretion those agencies were unable to consider facts and
circumstances that might justify exceptions from the extensive
guidelines set forth in DAPA. 198 Moreover, the very specific
prescriptions in the statute regarding the process for parents to obtain
immigration classifications based on their child’s status were superior
to substantive rules set forth, without following the proper procedure,
in the DAPA memoranda. 199 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion
highlights not only the importance of following proper APA
procedure, but of circumscribing any administrative guidelines such
that they do not run manifestly contrary to the statue that is
being administered. 200
The flexibility created by discretion in agency action is highly
valuable when well-meaning administrators seek to prioritize the
allocation of resources, but can cause problems in cases of agencies are
“captured” by external interest groups, or when the flexibility is used
to make categorical prosecution decisions that are discriminatory.201

195. Shepherd, supra note 60, at 1562–63.
196. Wadhia, supra note 3, at 246 n.4 (citing T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL.,
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 776 (6th ed. 2008)) (arguing that
“[p]rosecutorial discretion is applied at both a categorical and an individual level”).
197. Texas, 809 F.3d 134 at 171–72.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 186.
200. Id.
201. David Freeman Engstrom, Corralling Capture, 36 H ARV. J.L. & P UB . P OL ’ Y
31 (2013).
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When APA procedures are not used, courts are unable to obtain the
kind of administrative record that is necessary to ensure that this kind
of flexibility is used properly. Thus, the line between prosecutorial
discretion and failure to “execute” the law is blurred. That lack of
clarity is exacerbated any time plenary power is narrowly applied to
one branch of government without a recognition of how it interacts
with other branches that share that power.
IV. REDEFINING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION LAW
Many have argued that Judge Hanen and the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning was intentionally based on an “obscure and unsettled area
of administrative law” in order to delay DAPA’s application. 202 While
it is true that the line between administrative rules and discretionary
resource-allocation is unsettled, much of the controversy over how
courts should approach judicial review of immigration questions has
touched upon administrative law since the APA was passed in 1946.203
However, the facts underlying the case provide interesting insight into
the benefits of transparency in evaluating constitutional as well as
statutory challenges to immigration decisions.
The court’s treatment of DAPA is unique in the history of judicial
review of immigration decisions. The outcome of the case involves the
deportation or deferred action of potentially millions of individuals.
While the vast majority of immigration case law deals with individual
deportation or other proceedings, the far-reaching nature of DAPA
highlights concerns about the purpose of the APA, separation of
powers, and institutional protection for the constitutional rights of
noncitizens. In a case like the Texas case, transparency on the part of
the court in its constitutional analysis has the potential to significantly
impact the approach of immigrations agencies and officials as they
implement immigration law. For example, agency counsel would be
able to issue guidance based on court pronouncements recognizing
due process rights for immigrant criminals, or protection against
discrimination. As a result, systems and processes could be put in place

202. David Ingram & Mica Rosenberg, Texas judge’s immigration rebuke may be hard to
challenge, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2015, 11:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2015/02/18/us-usa-immigration-courts-analysis-idUSKBN0LM02Y20150218.
203. See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49–50 (1950) (holding that a
deportation hearing was an adjudication “required by statute” so as not to bring the statute into
“constitutional jeopardy” even though the statute did not expressly require a hearing).
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that streamline immigration decisions rather than relying on flexible
and unpredictable discretion in the hands of field officers. By
eliminating ambiguity on the ground level, such pronouncements
could also serve to moderate the political battle over what actions are
appropriate for the executive branch within the mandate of
immigration statutes and which actions should be left to Congress.
Additionally, if courts would fully brief and evaluate all issues that are
raised by administrative action, such as the take care clause analysis
performed by the Supreme Court, they would be better equipped to
navigate the complicated and weighty questions that arise in
immigration matters.
If an analysis of the history of plenary power and its relationship
to the APA has revealed anything, it is that these two areas of law are
sufficiently complex standing alone. When applied together, courts are
left to pick and choose the components that support desired
outcomes, or simply use those provisions to disguise constitutional
decision making. In their simplest form, plenary power and the APA
represent two competing interests that are in tension in immigration
law: the APA seeks to reign in agency action, while plenary power
attempts to provide greater flexibility. For those reasons, this
Comment recommends the disentaglement of plenary power from
judicial review of administrative decisions under the APA.
A. Disentangling Plenary Power from Constitutional Judicial Review
It would be a simple matter for courts to analyze constitutional
issues while still granting plenary power. Courts could recognize
plenary power by granting deference to the political branches while
providing meaningful review any time plenary power is used to exceed
the bounds of constitutional law. Thus, Congress and the President
would have the power to set immigration policy according to their
preferences and the preferences of their constituents so long as those
policies did not violate the constitutional rights of others. Providing
that discretion while preserving basic constitutional rights would
provide a clear standard for lower courts to follow and disperse much
of the mystery and complexity surrounding immigration law.
If the court had been more transparent in Jean, for example, the
benefits would have been extensive and immediately apparent, and the
costs minimal. Instead of holding that abuses of the INS’s parole
discretion would violate the statute as long as the statute was
interpreted constitutionally, the Court might have addressed the
1597
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constitutional issue head-on to hold that the Constitution, rather than
an obscure statute, prevented the Attorney General from considering
race or national origin in regulating the conduct of aliens. 204 Such a
holding would have avoided a number of confusing questions about
how narrowly or broadly the scope of the court’s statutory holding
applied and whether courts would be required to exercise constant
judicial oversight of the Attorney General, thereby limiting his
discretion. A constitutional holding, on the other hand, would draw a
clear line for the Attorney General and for all other immigration
officials whose roles fit a similar description. In that case, the court
would be required only to exercise review where the constitutional
rights outlined were violated.
For examples of how such decisions have been received and
followed, one need look no further than a line of cases that validated
the constitutional rights of aliens. Some have argued that these cases
do not apply to all aliens, construing them as non-immigration cases,
or limiting their holding to due process rights. 205 However, that
reasoning is circular because it begins with the assumption that
plenary power prevents the holding from applying to all immigration
cases. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that aliens of
Chinese descent could operate laundries in San Francisco because the
Constitution protected all individuals within the United States from
discrimination by the state. 206 Later, the Court held in Wong Wing v.
United States that a federal policy that imprisoned any Chinese
immigrant found illegally in the United States for hard labor was still
required to observe those individuals’ Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights. 207 Critics have argued that Yick Wo was not an immigration
case at all. 208 However, the holding in Yick Wo that constitutional
protections applied to all individuals within the United States would
naturally extend to all immigration cases if plenary power was not
able to prevent constitutional review. Similarly, critics seek to limit
Wong Wing, arguing that it provides only due process rights rather
than making a general statement about the application of the

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
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Motomura, supra note 6, at 604–05.
Id. at 554–55.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896).
Motomura, supra note 6, at 565–67.
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Constitution to immigrants. While it is certainly true that subsequent
cases have so limited Yick Wo and Wong Wing, 209 the commonalities
between the analysis in those cases provides a much more stable
foundation for judicial review than the widely varied attempts to limit
immigration law on the basis of statutory technicalities or creative
interpretations to avoid constitutional review.
If Jean had followed this line of cases instead of finding statutory
justification while still respecting immigration officials’ plenary power,
the executive branch would not have to mete out substantive rights to
immigrants at its discretion because the judicial pronouncement
would instead require that basic individual rights be protected.
Instead, immigration law has been defined by Supreme Court cases
that grant procedural due process rights only to immigrants subject to
deportation proceedings. 210
B. Impact on the Power of APA Review
Discretion in immigration enforcement is more likely to violate
important human and individual rights when there is no threat of
judicial review. While deference may increase the efficiency and speed
of deportation, courts can do for immigration law what they have
done for every other area of law—preserve human rights by threat of
judicial review, while only reviewing a comparatively small handful of
cases. Indeed, if we believe that our judicial system is what we say it is,
we should have no trouble empowering judges at the expense of
efficiency. Our entire governmental system is designed to sacrifice
efficiency interests in favor of more important values like democratic
legitimacy, the protection of individual rights, and justice. 211
Of course, in some cases, judicial review may literally not be
feasible. Just as in urgent domestic safety matters such as nationwide
strikes by safety or security personnel, or imminent national security
threats like the Cuban missile crisis, executive and administrative
actors should have the real-time flexibility to act within their expertise
in order to preserve national security. However, for the great majority
209. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
210. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
211. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (quoting Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)) (“The fact that a given law or
procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing
alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not
the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.”).
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of cases and administrative decisions, our nation’s safety or security is
not threatened, and immigration decisions should proceed carefully
with great respect for the rights of individuals. If attorneys prosecuting
murderers or guards overseeing Guantanamo prisoners can do it,
certainly officials asked to evaluate noncitizens’ deportation status can
show cautious regard for individual rights.
Recent attempts to focus deportation priorities on convicted
criminals provides another example. While this practice is generally
uncontroversial, significant humanitarian concerns can still be raised
in cases where long-time residents are convicted for minor criminal
conduct after entering the United States. 212 While the practice seeks to
remedy national security concerns associated with the increase of
illegal immigration, it incidentally takes a step back from a century of
progress toward overt recognition of human rights in immigration
law. 213 The convergence of criminal and immigration law, however, has
the potential to further insulate those that apply immigration law from
constitutional review and, as a result, delay the extension of basic
constitutional rights to noncitizens that live in the United States. 214
Such a policy results in an inconsistent approach to discretion for
immigration officials because it broadens agency discretion whenever
officials tend to value immigrant rights over enforcement, and reduces
discretion when officials tend to value enforcement over
humanitarian concerns.
Thus, while providing deference to the executive and legislative
branches may seem like the quickest solution to the obvious human
rights challenges in immigration law, that deference in fact impedes a
long-term solution by entrenching traditional abdication of judicial
responsibility based on plenary power. Moreover, the veiled analysis
and “phantom constitutional norms” of the current system wreak
havoc on constitutional separation of powers by each branch to
participate in its own balancing of human rights and national

212. Kanstroom, supra note 52, at 1893.
213. Wadhia, supra note 52, at 387 (“A number of measures contained in this legislation
make it more difficult for immigrants to see a judge prior to deportation, impose excessive
punishment for immigrants who fit under ‘tough-sounding’ labels, increase the number of
immigrants who can be detained by the government without an opportunity to ask for bond,
and remove the ability of judges and immigration officers to consider an individual’s equities,
circumstances, and other factors when determining if he should be deported.”).
214. Kanstroom, supra note 52, at 1907–09.
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security. 215 As a result, the system is fraught with numerous and widely
varied approaches to resolving difficult questions, leading to divergent
and contradictory outcomes. 216 That is how we end up with a
Democratic President usurping executive authority while a Republican
Congress digs in its heels to defund essential administrative agencies.
What is needed is a uniform standard—a pronouncement where the
line is clearly drawn in order to protect individual rights. In order to
provide that clarity, courts should move toward greater transparency
in weighing the interests and rights involved in deportation decisions
so that immigration officials must orient themselves toward outcomes
that respect those rights, or answer to a federal court.
C. Removing Plenary Power from Administrative Agencies
A few courts have extended the plenary power doctrine explicitly
to administrative actions. 217 However, most courts simply avoid
constitutional issues in reviewing agency immigration decisions on the
assumption that plenary power applies. While Chevron deference at
least requires a finding of ambiguity before deferring to agencies, 218
decisions based on plenary power allow a court to find that the action
taken by the agency was one that was acceptable to Congress under
long-standing administrative practice. Therefore, such acts should be
validated, without further analysis as a manifestation of Congress’s
plenary power. 219
For these reasons, it is imperative that courts do not impose
limitations on judicial review that are based on plenary power in
administrative law. Judicial review of agency action is already
sufficiently limited by deference intended to provide agencies with
needed flexibility in administering the law. Specifically, courts
215. Motomura, supra note 6, at 600–01 (explaining that using constitutional
norms only as a guide for interpretation rather than explicitly results in overbreadth as
well as underinclusivity).
216. Id. (pointing out that phantom constitutional norms create precedent that is difficult
to apply predictably); Kanstroom, supra note 52, at 1920–21.
217. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 457–58 (1920) (holding that that an
administrative exclusion was final unless it could be shown to be an abuse of the power given to
executive officers by the statute). Motomura, supra note 6, at 613.
218. Scalia, supra note 80, at 511–12.
219. Schuck, supra note 8, at 31–34 (arguing that deference was inappropriate because,
for some reason, when “sovereignty confronts strangers, the Constitution can be subordinated
to a congressional statute, indeed, to mere administrative practice”).
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reviewing agency action should use Chevron deference to prioritize the
mandates of the legislative branch over agency interpretations, and
reserve plenary power for analysis of strictly legislative and executive
action. In today’s complex, bureaucratic, administrative state, analysis
of executive agency action is complicated enough, and plenary power
has only served to prevent careful review of immigration agencies’
attempts to administer the mandates of the political branches.
Interestingly, an empirical review of 1,843 cases after Nicholas
reveals both the substantive nature of rights that are provided and the
importance of not granting plenary power to agencies. 220 The study of
1,843 deportation cases reveals that many candidates for deportation
qualified for deferred status because they were deemed mentally
incompetent or infirm— the very same grounds for which they had
initially been subjected to deportation. 221 The study found that over
100 of the 1,843 individuals were granted deferred status for
“humanitarian factors,” despite the fact that they had been convicted
of criminal drug offenses. 222 That study, and the secretive nature of the
deferred action policy prior to Lennon, demonstrate the importance
of judicial review of administrative actions that is not limited by
plenary power. In sum, Lennon and Nicholas brought public and
political attention to the fact that the use of plenary power in
reviewing agency action actually counteracts plenary power that
should be reserved for the executive and legislative branches. To the
extent that courts fail to review agency action, agencies are free to act
independently from or contrary to the will of the political branches
of government.
CONCLUSION
While a more comprehensive review of the interaction between
plenary power and the APA in immigration law is certainly in order,
this brief analysis reveals at least two important insights. First, plenary
power can serve a legitimate role in preserving much-needed flexibility
in the political branches as long as it is coupled with greater
transparency regarding constitutional protections for noncitizens.
Second, plenary power has no role in judicial review of agency action
because those actions are already dangerously independent from
220. Wildes, supra note 30, at 49.
221. Id. at 53–55.
222. Id. at 51.
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oversight by the political branches, and the use of the doctrine to
further insulate them is directly contrary to the doctrine’s purpose.
Both of these insights point toward a need to bring individual
rights for aliens back into the jurisdiction of the judiciary—our
nation’s watchdog for individual rights. Noncitizens would no longer
be left to sort out confusing paperwork and agency directives while
overcrowded immigrations offices leave millions of aliens in limbo.223
Arnulfo and Pedro, whatever the final outcome of their cases may be,
will feel confident that they are protected. While these slight
adjustments to judicial review of immigration decisions will not solve
all of our nation’s immigration-related problems, they will at least
focus the debate on the issues that are most important, and protect
individual rights along the way.
Kyler McCarty ∗

223. Wadhia, supra note 3, at 298.
∗ J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, December 2015. The author
thanks Professor Carolina Núñez for her insightful comments and guidance.
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